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   1
Institutional approaches to the study of development now dominate the mainstream of 
development economics. In other social science disciplines they have long 
predominated. No one denies the centrality of traditional determinants of growth, such 
as investment or technological progress, but institutional analysis is considered 
fundamental to understanding the levels and effects of these traditional variables. 
Variations in institutional context are theorized as underlying variations in both levels of 
investment and the incorporation of technological progress. Likewise, the extent to 
which a given level of investment or a particular innovation actually results in a 
sustained increase in output is view as depending on the institutional context. 
In their contribution to the Handbook of Economic Growth, Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (AJR 2004: 1) pull no punches: ‘differences in economic institutions are the 
fundamental cause of differences in economic development’. Dani Rodrik, in a co-
authored paper (Rodrik et al. 2004)1 called ‘Institutions Rule’ is equally 
straightforward: ‘the quality of institutions “trumps” everything else’. Easterly and 
Levine (2003) and Bardhan (2005), among many others, offer further support for the 
primacy of institutions. 
Dissenters continue resist the rise of the institutional perspective. Jeff Sachs and his 
collaborators continue to push geography and disease as fundamental causes of 
differences in national wealth and incomes (Gallup et al. 1998; Sachs 2001). Engerman 
and Sokoloff (1997; 2002) are more restrained, but argue that current explanatory 
frameworks have gone overboard in neglecting the way in which institutions are 
themselves shaped by natural factor endowments. 
There is merit in these dissenting points of view, but the ‘institutional turn’ (Evans 
2004; 2005) is not likely to be reversed. Even if endowments, geography and disease 
would to gain purchase at the level of cross-national analysis, which they do not seem to 
be doing, these approaches would still be at a disadvantage. The logic of institutional 
analysis can be replicated at different levels of analysis, ranging from the very powerful 
district level comparisons recently executed by Banerjee and Iyer (2002) using Indian 
data to the carefully designed micro-level research of new generation of empirically 
oriented development economists (see, for example, Miguel 2004). 
Institutional approaches also offer more fruitful forms of engagement with policy 
debates than natural endowment-based theories. Institutions can be constructed and 
reconstructed; natural endowments and geography must be lived with. Even if initial 
disadvantages are created by endowments (including ‘negative endowments’ like 
disease burden), ameliorating such disadvantages still requires institutional 
transformation. Future debates over the dynamics of development, both theoretical and 
empirical, will take place on the terrain of institutional analysis. 
How will the institutional turn evolve? In its early ‘Northian’ manifestations 
institutional analysis was under theorized. ‘Property rights’ was forced to carry far too 
heavy an explanatory burden. More recent work, by economists and other social 
scientists, has extended the institutional turn in ways that show promise of substantially 
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enhancing our understanding of development with more sophisticated theorizing and 
consideration of a broader range of historical and contemporary data. 
In this paper, I will look briefly at the problems of an under theorized, property rights 
version of the institutional turn. Then I will turn to the way in which the property rights 
perspective becomes transformed in practice. I will focus particularly on the 
paradigmatic work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR). To show how the 
institutional turn has been further extended, I will use the interaction of the work of a 
political scientist/sociologist, James Mahoney with the work of Robinson (of AJR) in 
the specific historical context of nineteenth century Central America. Finally, I will use 
ARJ’s analysis of the case of Botswana, especially in contrast to the sociological 
analysis of Ann Swidler, to make the case for the necessity of additional extensions. 
Institutions, property rights and development 
Definitions of institutions are notoriously unspecific. The one offered by Douglass 
North (1994: 360), in his Nobel Prize lecture – ‘the rules of the game: the humanly 
devised constraints that structure human interaction’ – is a good example.2 In practice, 
cross-national institutional analyses of development use a ‘double-finesse’ to surmount 
this lack of conceptual specificity. On the one hand, they tend to use simple, concrete 
empirical proxies to stand for complex combinations of institutions. Perhaps most 
popular are the various measures put out by commercial ‘Political Risk’ services such as 
those embodied in the ratings of the International Country Risk Guides. Exactly what 
‘institutions’ are reflected in these measures is difficult, indeed often impossible, to 
figure out, but they are available for a full range of countries at varying points in time. 
This element of the finesse is the key to empirical feasibility. 
The second element of the finesse is on the theoretical side. The specific concrete 
measures used are assumed to reflect ‘institutions’ at an abstract level reflecting the 
aggregate character of a whole complex of institutions – usually defined as ‘property 
rights institutions’. It is a generically plausible finesse and an essential one given the 
low face validity of the empirical measures used. The theoretical finesse rests on a 
simple and very plausible logic in which propensities to make productive investments 
depend on the predictability of future rights to claim the returns from those assets. If 
people cannot count on maintaining future control of assets that they consider theirs, 
then investing in productive assets whose benefits are only accrued in the future makes 
less sense. Income consumed is hard to take away and hoarded assets are easier to 
defend than productive ones (which must be exposed to public view to reap their 
benefits). A combination of consumption and hoarding makes more sense than 
investment when assets are insecure. 
The idea that people need predictable societal rules and equally predictable public 
enforcement if they are to engage in productive investments makes sense. The idea that 
historically specific property rights arrangements can be arrayed along a simple ordinal 
scale is anything but plausible. Any initial allocation of rights to different kinds of 
property – ranging from land to the broadcast spectrum to the human genome – is 
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disputable and somewhat arbitrary. Enforcement of rights once they have been allocated 
is equally so. Sending the National Guard to evict peasants growing crops on a 
landlord’s otherwise unused land is enforcing property rights. So is shutting down a 
factory whose pollution is making the surrounding neighborhood unlivable. 
Development almost certainly depends on how property rights are allocated and what 
kind of property rights are enforced for what segments of the population. Exactly how 
these complex patterns of allocation and enforcement are related, positively or 
negatively, to development can hardly be taken for granted. 
Neither the empirical proxies for institutions that have been used in most cross-national 
institutional analyses of development nor reliance on a simple ordinal notion of 
‘effective property rights’ would seem propitious starting points for understanding 
developmental success or failure. Nonetheless, broad quantitative cross-national 
institutional analyses, stimulated theoretically by thinking about property rights, have 
generated intellectually exciting debates that belie the apparent foundational weaknesses 
of the approach. Some of the best examples have been generated by the collaboration of 
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 
A paradigmatic example of extending the institutional turn 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (hereafter AJR) have produced a prolific set of 
institutional analyses of development (e.g., 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005). Here, I will 
use their already classic 2001 article in the American Economic Review as a starting 
point, in part because it conforms to the general ‘double finesse’ model that I have just 
laid out, but more important because it demonstrates the tendency for high quality 
analysis that begins from the double finesse to transcend it. 
In their 2001 article AJR start with a traditional measure of ‘good institutions’ that has 
been used before. It is called ‘Average Expropriation Risk 1985-95’, was originally put 
forward by a consulting firm call ‘Political Risk Services’ and subsequently used by 
Steve Knack and Phil Keefer (1995) in a frequently cited article. The theoretical 
proposition that accompanies these results is a classic abstract Northian property rights 
argument: 
Countries with better ‘institutions’, more secure property rights, and less 
distortionary policies will invest more in physical and human capital, and 
will use these factors more efficiently to achieve a greater level of 
income (e.g., Douglas North and Robert Thomas 1973, North 1981, …). 
(AJR 2001: 1) 
What makes AJR’s analysis more interesting than so many in this ilk is that they are so 
thoroughly aware of both the gap between their measure and their theory and the extent 
to which the concept of ‘property rights institutions is underspecified. In the conclusion 
to their paper they say:  
There are many questions that our analysis does not address. Institutions 
are treated largely as a ‘black-box’… Institutional features, such as 
expropriation risk, property rights enforcement or rule of law, should 
probably be interpreted as an equilibrium outcome, related to some more   4
fundamental ‘institutions’, e.g., presidential vs. parliamentary system, 
which can be changed directly. (AJR 2001: 27) 
Despite their skepticism, AJR do an impeccable job at executing the empirical analysis. 
Their measure gives them good regression results and they do a thorough job of 
checking the robustness of the results in the face of the full gamut of possible statistical 
controls. In order to drive a stake into the heart of the endogeneity problem they use 
‘settler mortality rates’ at the time of colonization as an instrument for early institutions. 
This turns out to be a statistically effective instrument. Perhaps more important, it leads 
them to undertake a much more historically oriented analysis than would have been the 
case had they focused simply on the contemporary relationship reflected by their 
primary measure. 
By adding an historical dimension to their cross-sectional regression analysis, AJR have 
gotten themselves into some trouble with social scientists from other disciplines who 
question the accuracy of their comparisons of colonial institutions (see Mahoney 2003; 
Lange et al. forthcoming). At the same time, AJR have been stimulated by their 
historical instrumental variable to open up the institutional ‘black box’ in interesting and 
potentially fruitful ways. 
AJR’s basic argument is that where there were large amounts of resources (mineral 
deposits or land suitable to crops in high demand on world markets) and large 
indigenous populations to exploit, colonialists created ‘extractive institutions’. Where 
settlers had to survive largely on the basis of their own efforts, ‘institutions of private 
property’ emerged. AJR clarify what they mean by ‘extractive institutions’ and 
‘institutions of private property’ by using a set of concrete historical examples. 
Australia and New Zealand are used as archetypes of positive institutional development: 
In the case of Australia, AJR note that the main goal of the settlers was ‘legal protection 
against the arbitrary power of landowners’. They go on to say, ‘The settlers wanted 
institutions and political rights like those prevailing in England at the time. They 
demanded jury trials, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and electoral representation’ (AJR 
2001: 8). In the case of New Zealand, AJR focus on the effort to build up public 
infrastructure as represented by what they call an ‘enormous boom in public investment’ 
(AJR 2001: 8). 
Neither the idea that broad democratic rights are a key aspect of ‘institutions of private 
property, nor the key developmental role of state investment in infrastructure’, is 
reflected in AJR’s statistical modeling of institutions and growth, but these are 
reoccurring themes in AJR’s subsequent work. For example, in their next paper (AJR 
2002: 17) ‘institutions of private property’ are defined as ‘a cluster of (political, 
economic and social) institutions ensuring that a broad cross-section of society has 
effective property rights’ [emphasis added]. In a 2003 paper they explicitly divide the 
requirements for effective property rights into two components. The first is the 
traditional Northian general provision of secure property rights. The second is the 
requirement that such rights are extended to a ‘broad cross-section of the society’. Thus, 
they argue, a society in which a ‘small fraction of the population’ monopolizes control 
of property does not fully qualify as having ‘institutions of private property’, ‘even if 
the property rights of this elite are secure’ (AJR 2003: 5).   5
Specification of the institutions that encourage investment in human capital and other 
kinds of productive assets is further elaborated when members of the AJR team turn 
their analytical lenses on regional and country case studies. Robinson’s work on Central 
American, a set of cases that also happen to be the focus of the work of James 
Mahoney, one of AJR’s most prominent critics, is a good example. 
A regional laboratory for comparative institutional analysis 
Central America offers a fascinating comparative microcosm for examining questions of 
institutions and growth. Five countries share a similar colonial heritage, history of 
commodity exports and geo-political position.3 Yet, once cut loose from the formal 
control of the Spanish empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they have 
strikingly different institutional histories and levels of economic success. 
Robinson’s analysis of Central America (done jointly with Jeffrey Nugent) focuses on a 
paired comparison of four coffee producers: Costa Rica and Columbia on the one hand 
and Guatemala and El Salvador on the other.4 Coffee became the major export crop for 
all four countries during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Yet, the first two ended 
up with roughly double the incomes, and much higher levels of human development 
than the other two. Nugent and Robinson’s argument is straightforward. In the former 
pair of countries (Costa Rica and Columbia), small holders play a major or even 
dominant role, while in the latter pair (Guatemala and El Salvador) coffee production is 
dominated by large landholders. In short, in Guatemala and El Salvador AJR’s second 
requirement for institutions of private property, the ‘broad cross-section requirement’, is 
violated. 
This difference in the structure of landholdings grew out of the institutions that re-
shaped property rights in the mid to late nineteenth century. Land that was formerly 
communal, public or owned by the church was privatized in all four countries, but 
privatization took a different form in the two pairs. In Guatemala and El Salvador, new 
laws fostered a ‘land grab’ by elites. In Colombia and Costa Rica, smallholders were 
allowed to retain a share of the newly privatized lands. Since, according to Nugent and 
Robinson (2001: 4), smallholder coffee production is more economically efficient and 
associated with higher levels of investment, especially in human capital, the political-
legal institutions of nineteenth Guatemala and El Salvador resulted in depressed rates of 
investment and growth over the course of the next 100 years. 
How do Nugent and Robinson explain why Guatemalan and El Salvadorian elites chose 
the less efficient option? Because large plantations gave these elites control of labour as 
well as land and allowed them to extract monopsony rents from labor as well as returns 
from the land. Why didn’t elites in Colombia and Costa Rica make the same choices? 
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Because they were less unified, facing a greater level of political competition and, 
therefore, less able to turn legal and administrative institutions to exclusionary ends. 
In Nugent and Robinson we see the evolution of the AJR perspective both toward a 
firmer focus on the distributional aspects of property rights as the key to their 
developmental efficacy and toward an emphasis on forms of political competition as the 
underlying determinants of distributional rules.5 In outlining the political dynamics of 
elite strategies in nineteenth century Central America, Nugent and Robinson rely 
heavily on James Mahoney’s 2001 book Legacies of Liberalism. It is, therefore, 
interesting to examine the way in which Mahoney’s political science training results in a 
different reading of the process, based on essentially the same historical evidence. 
Mahoney’s interpretation of the institutional dynamics separating Costa Rica’s 
development from that of El Salvador and Guatemala parallels Nugent and Robinson’s 
paired comparison, but also differs in key respects.6 Nugent and Robinson see legal and 
political institutions as reflecting a vector of elite economic interests which is summed 
through a process of political competition. It might even be argued that, for Nugent and 
Robinson, institutions are not real ‘causes’ at all but simply ‘transmission belts’ which 
instantiate the effects of pre-existing economic and political interests. Mahoney has a 
different view of how institutional change works, one which emphasizes both political 
agency, especially during what he calls ‘critical junctures’, and the subsequent effects of 
the institutional legacies generated by choices made during these ‘critical junctures’. 
Like Nugent and Robinson, Mahoney emphasizes the role of political competition, but 
he evaluates both its relative intensity in different countries and its effects differently. 
Like Nugent and Robinson, he sees elites in Guatemala and El Salvador as ‘radical 
liberals’, promoting the legal right of large landowners to control both land and labor 
much more aggressively than the ‘reformist’ liberal elites of Costa Rica. But, in contrast 
to Nugent and Robinson, Mahoney sees the motivation of elite choices as not simply, or 
even primarily, the promotion of the interests of large landholders. He argues that, while 
these elites did generally promote the interests of large landholders, the primary 
attraction of radical strategies was that such strategies appeared to be the most effective 
way of gaining and consolidating political control in the face of staunch opposition from 
conservative forces, such as the church and its traditionalist allies. 
Mahoney also emphasizes the crucial role of building new institutions to enforce the 
radical new definitions of property rights. The construction of new national state 
apparatuses with vastly expanded powers of coercion was the heart of the institutional 
agenda of radical liberalism in Guatemala and El Salvador. Radical liberalism not only 
polarized rural class structures but also brought forth powerful military-coercive state 
apparatuses. 
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This is not to say that Mahoney sees state building in general as having a negative effect 
on development. State-building was an essential element for the export-led growth 
projects of both radical and reformist liberalizing regimes. In the same way that the state 
in the settler colonies discussed by AJR invested heavily in infrastructure, both radical 
and reformist regimes in Central America built powerful interventionist state 
apparatuses in order to help coffee producers take advantage of export market 
opportunities. There was, however, a fundamental difference between radical and 
reformist strategies. Just as Costa Rica’s political leadership saw exclusionary 
transformation of property rights as creating more political risks than benefits, they 
were wary of the political risks involved in expansion of the military-coercive side of 
the state apparatus, and therefore refrained from expanding this facet of the state. 
For Mahoney, the contrasting property rights institutions and state apparatuses that 
emerged in nineteenth century Central America cannot be read as transmission belts for 
previously defined interests in the way that Robinson and Nugent suggest. While 
antecedent conditions in Guatemala and El Salvador created an affinity for radical 
liberalism, reformist liberal strategies were still available to nineteenth century political 
leaderships in these countries. Furthermore, it is apparent in hindsight that the reformist 
option could have resulted in greater long-term economic gains even for local elites in 
Guatemala and El Salvador, say nothing of non-elites. Conversely, while antecedent 
conditions in Costa Rica created an affinity for reformist liberalism, its nineteenth 
century political leaders could still have seen the more radical option as the best strategy 
for remaining in power. 
Once these political choices were made, institutions that resulted took on a causal life of 
their own. Once in place, military coercive apparatuses developed a set of preferences 
that went beyond those of economic elites, preferences that focused particularly on the 
preservation of the military’s own power and privilege. The effects of the military’s 
preferences and capacity persisted even after the agrarian export operations they had 
been created to defend fell into decay. When reform efforts generated political conflicts 
in mid-twentieth century Guatemala, the coercive apparatus played the determinative 
role in initiating a half century of state terror in order to prevent reform. When a similar 
set of reform efforts led to political conflict that deteriorated into civil war in Costa Rica 
in 1948, there was no military coercive apparatus capable of playing the deciding role. 
An evolution in the direction of real democratic elections and a long period of social 
reform was the result. 
Both the points of consensus between Mahoney’s perspective that of AJR and their 
points of difference provide useful signposts for the extension of the institutional turn. 
There are two key points of consensus. The first is on the developmental disadvantages 
of radically inegalitarian distributions of property rights. Mahoney’s analysis firmly 
supports AJR’s ‘broad cross-section’ requirement. The second is on the necessity of 
building a state apparatus whose capacities are focused on providing sufficient 
investment in infrastructure. 
The two perspectives are, however, quite different in their analysis of the causes and 
consequences of political choices. In the model of AJR and Nugent and Robinson, once 
colonial rulers have set the institutional matrix in place, the enduring effects of 
constellations of endowments and interests generate institutional persistence. In 
Mahoney’s ‘critical juncture – legacy’ model institutions emerge out of uncertain, 
politically motivated choices, made primarily during ‘critical junctures’ when   8
developmental possibilities are in flux. These choices become embodied in new 
organizations and sets of social actors, with new interests and capacities, which become 
causal factors in their own right. Particularly important in this respect are the perverse 
consequences of the hypertrophy of the coercive side of the state apparatus. 
The contrast between AJR and Mahoney may not, however, be as great as it appears in 
the Central American context. If we turn our attention to another case that has been the 
focus of AJR’s work – the surprising economic success of Botswana, AJR sound much 
more like Mahoney. Political choices made during critical junctures, state-building and 
the avoidance of the over-investment in the coercive side of the state apparatus all play 
a key role in the emergence of an institutional context favorable to developmental 
success. 
Successful ‘institutions of private property’ in Africa 
Like many other analysts of Botswana, AJR call it an ‘African Success Story’. The data 
certainly support this view. From the seventies through the end of the twentieth century, 
Botswana’s GDP per capita grew at a rate that made it look as though it was part of East 
Asia. By the end of the century, Botswana’s PPP GDP was roughly four times the 
average for Southern Africa. 
Sceptics of the institutional turn might try to reduce Botswana’s success to a story of 
endowments: diamond reserves sufficient to sustain a couple of billion dollars worth of 
exports a year and a population of only one and a half million. This facile explanation 
does not hold up to comparative scrutiny. As the sad case of Sierra Leone illustrates, 
diamond mines can as easily turn into a ‘resource curse’ as a resource bonanza. If we 
rephrase the question from ‘Why did Botswana grow so fast?’ to ‘How did Botswana 
avoid the resource curse and take such exemplary advantage of its resources?’, then 
‘good institutions’ seems a reasonable answer. 
What do we mean by ‘good institutions’ in this case? While AJR stick to the label 
‘institutions of private property’, their actual historical analysis focuses on political 
institutions, political choices and the state apparatus in a way that is reminiscent of 
Mahoney’s analysis of Central America. Providing appropriate incentives to local 
private investors seems to have had little to do with Botswana’s success. Development 
seems instead to have depended on the ability of Botswana’s leadership to build a state 
apparatus that avoided the coercive concentration of property rights and focused on 
building the capacity to provide effective infrastructure. Despite dramatically different 
endowments and historical circumstances, Botswana’s strategy looks eerily similar to 
‘reformist liberalism’ in nineteenth century Central America. 
As in nineteenth century Central America, political choices in the immediate post-
colonial period were crucial. AJR (2003: 1) emphasize the importance of ‘a number of 
critical decisions made by the post independence leaders’. The essence of these choices 
was to focus on the construction of a relatively non-coercive, resource-based, mini-
developmental state (see Leith 2002). Botswana’s political leaders were able, early on, 
to secure a contract with a transnational diamond mining company that gave the 
government 50 per cent of all export revenues. This, in turn, allowed the government to 
maintain a reasonably well paid, meritocratic bureaucracy in which ‘probity, relative   9
autonomy and competency have been nurtured and sustained’ (Parsons 1984, quoted in 
AJR). About 40 per cent of all formal sector jobs are in public service, and the 
government invests a larger share of public expenditures in education than either the US 
or Canada. 
Post-independence political elites made no effort to replicate the equivalent of the 
nineteenth century Central American land grab by looting the eminently lootable 
resources at their disposal, choosing instead to construct state institutions whose 
capacity to invest in infrastructure would mitigate the effect of existing inequalities. 
They also constructed a system of stable, relatively democratic, rule (i.e. a multi-party 
system with regular elections and a real possibility – though one never realized in 
practice – that the ruling party could lose). Post-hoc it is clear that their political 
instincts were correct, but prescience is a suspicious explanation of political choice. A 
more plausible explanation, and the one favored by AJR, is that pre-colonial political 
models created an affinity for less coercive choices. These post-independence political 
choices, while certainly not determined by earlier political models, were consistent with 
them. 
Fortunately for the Batswana, the extent of Botswana’s resource wealth was not 
apparent during the period when colonial institutions were constructed. Botswana was 
more or less ignored during the colonial period, escaping the imposition of rapacious set 
of ‘extractive institutions’. The traditional, pre-colonial leadership of the Batswana had 
managed to convince a population characterized by considerable diversity of ethnic 
origins that they were all part of a single socio-culturally grounded political entity.7 At 
the same time, traditional Tswana political culture was characterized by a set of 
practices (kgotla assemblies) that gave adult males considerable leverage over the chiefs 
that ruled this unified political entity.  
In short, exceptional resource endowments and a legacy of stable political institutions 
gave post-independence leaders the option of tolerating political constraints in return for 
continued adherence to the existing ‘rules of the game’ on the part of political 
competitors, instead of opting for maximizing their share of the wealth and investing in 
the means of violence necessary to keep political competitors from doing the same. 
They made the most of this option. 
The Botswana case reinforces Central American lessons. Like nineteenth century Costa 
Rican elites, Botswana’s political leadership calculated that the possible economic 
rewards from trying to amass an even larger share of the national wealth and 
constructing the coercive apparatus necessary to enforce such a negative redistribution 
were not worth the political risks involved in expanding the means of violence. In 
twentieth century Africa as in nineteenth century Central America, the political 
institutions that support this kind of choice appear to generate substantial economic 
returns. 
A conundrum remains. Traditional property rights (primarily ownership of cattle) were 
highly unequally distributed in pre-independence Botswana and Botswana today is more 
unequal than either Guatemala or El Salvador. Does Botswana suggest that AJR’s 
                                                 
7   The analogies to Miguel’s (2004) analysis of post-colonial nation-building in Tanzania are 
provocative.   10
‘broad cross-section requirement’ is not really a requirement? Public investment in 
human capital and the possibility of upward mobility via the public sector obviate the 
importance of the ‘broad cross-section requirement’. Is there no developmental 
disadvantage to leaving the ‘broad cross-section’ relatively deprived of property rights 
as long as this deprivation takes the form of the maintenance of a long established, 
culturally validated traditional social hierarchy? 
AJR do not comment the implications of Botswana for their ‘broad cross section 
requirement’, but the reversal of fortune which Botswana has suffered in the last ten 
years as a result of HIV AIDS, suggests that violating the broad cross-section 
requirement had a price, even in Botswana. Even with rapid growth and democratic 
rule, quietly maintained hierarchies may result in a state apparatus unable to effectively 
engage a sufficiently broad cross-section of the population in developmentally essential 
projects when this becomes necessary. 
Redefining good institutions: Botswana and the challenge of AIDS 
Throughout the 1990s there was the puzzle about Botswana’s inability to deal with 
AIDS. It was not just that Botswana did poorly; it did worse than other African 
countries that seem to be much less well endowed – either in terms of material 
resources, or in terms of effective institutions. A common point of comparison is 
Uganda, which was devastated by dictatorship and civil war and ravaged by AIDS in 
the 1980s, but is now recorded as having a higher life expectancy than Botswana. 
AJR (2003: 2) comment, ‘Not everything in Botswana is rosy. Though the statistics are 
not fully reliable, Botswana has one of the highest adult incidences of AIDS in the 
world’. They add that this ‘probably represents, above all else, a serious public policy 
failure’, but this failure does not figure in their evaluation of Botswana’s institutions. To 
fill this lacuna we are forced to move beyond economics and political science to Ann 
Swidler (2004), a sociologist who provides a provocative, even though preliminary, new 
perspective. 
Swidler takes AJR’s analysis of Botswana’s successful institutions as her starting point. 
Like others (e.g. Allen and Heald 2004), she begins by noting that the public policy 
response in Botswana has been precisely what one would expect on the basis of AJR’s 
institutional analysis – modern, competent, and thorough. Yet, the impact of the 
government’s effort on people’s behavior appears to have been minimal, or even 
perverse. Allen and Heald (2004: 1144) note that following the government’s 
educational campaign on the radio, AIDS became known as the ‘radio disease’ and a 
traditional Tswana interpretation of AIDS developed in which condoms were ‘an agent, 
not in the control of the disease, but rather in its very origin and spread’ and in which 
the disease was due to ‘disrespect for the mores of traditional culture’. For too many 
Batswana, avoiding the stigma of the disease still appears to be a more compelling 
motivation than engaging in treatment that requires publicly acknowledging having the 
disease. And the devastation continues. 
What went wrong? Swidler’s tentative answer (2004: 15-16) is that the government of 
Botswana lacks the ability to spark ‘the activation of social solidarities, the sense of 
community and the mobilization of collective identities’ necessary to break through the   11
stigma and denial that are natural responses to AIDS and generate real behaviour 
change. Mobilizational capacity, rather than regulatory or administrative, was what was 
needed. Mobilization was a task for which the Botswana political institutions had not 
been equipped by prior developmental successes. Nor had Botswana’s political leaders 
had to figure out how to create the political and social space in which NGO and 
community groups, which must play a key role in changing behaviour and values on the 
ground, could flourish. 
Whether or not Swidler’s analysis of the Botswana is eventually confirmed, it represents 
an important conceptual extension of the institutional turn. Swidler takes us beyond the 
classic ‘instrumental’ vision of the relationship between institutions and individual 
motivations, in which institutions enable individuals to pursue their own exogenous and 
taken for granted aims.8 In Swidler’s vision, an even more important role of institutions 
is enabling people to re-shape their preferences and motivations, creating new 
definitions of desirable, culturally-valued behaviour, in response to changing 
circumstance. 
At this point, we have left property rights behind, but perhaps not the political 
institutions that are associated with sustaining the ‘broad cross-section’ requirement. 
From AJR’s initial settle colony examples to Mahoney’s description of ‘reformist’ 
liberal regimes in Central America, one of the central requirements of maintaining the 
property rights of the ‘broad cross-section’ is that the broad cross-section be mobilized 
and active. In Swidler’s view of Botswana, what is needed is mobilization focused on 
changing goals and values rather than a more instrumental sort of mobilization, but in 
both cases broad-based mobilizational capacity is the key. 
Extending the institutional turn 
When we follow the trail of AJR and juxtapose their analysis with that of others 
working on the same cases, the heuristic potential of the institutional turn becomes 
apparent. No less apparent is the extent to which ‘institutions of private property’ is a 
conceptual procrustean bed, even for AJR themselves. As soon as cases are examined in 
detail, contestation over the distribution of political rights and power and the institutions 
that shape this contestation comes to the fore.9 
From the work of both AJR and Mahoney it would seem to follow that political 
institutions which discourage elites from grabbing a disproportionate share of national 
assets for themselves are the first key to developmentally effective private property 
rights. This proposition in turn suggests five important foci: What determines the 
collective rationalities shared political preferences of elites themselves? What 
determines the balance between the state’s exercise of its role as coercive apparatus and 
its role as essential source of investment in crucial collective goods? What possibilities 
                                                 
8   AJR (2001: 7) epitomize the ‘instrumental’ version of institutions in their description of settler 
colonies as having ‘representative institutions which promoted what the settlers wanted and that what 
they wanted was freedom and the ability to get rich by engaging in trade’. 
9   This observation is, of course, fully consistent with AJR’s own admonition (2001: quoted above) that 
the institutional turn should shift its focus toward institutions that are ‘more fundamental’.   12
for mobilization and access state power do political institutions affords non-elites? What 
kinds of historical circumstances turn these options into available political choices and 
what kinds of circumstances increase the determinative weight of prior institutional 
legacies? And, finally, as Swidler’s analysis reminds us, none of this can be analyzed 
simply in terms of the instrumental realization of a taken for granted goals and interests. 
Institutions enable individuals and societies to constitute new goals as well as enabling 
the satisfaction of goals and values already in place. 
Quests for answers to the first three questions must be tightly intertwined. Elite 
propensities to grab assets depend on shared perceptions that doing so is both feasible in 
terms of the relative political strength of both competitors and non-elites and necessary 
in order to maintain their dominant political status. The choices that elites make with 
regard to asset grabs have, in turn, strong implications for the character of the state. 
Grabbing assets and privileging the coercive side of the state apparatus are likely to go 
together. If the construction of state institutions focused on the provision of 
infrastructure rather than amassing coercive capacity is an essential element of 
developmental success, then elite asset-grab strategies will undercut development both 
directly through their distortion of the distribution of property and indirectly through 
their effect on the state. 
The political focus of the extended institutional turn gives non-elite mobilization a 
valence quite different from the one assumed in the old property rights version. Rather 
than property rights being threatened by the potential redistributional consequences of 
non-elite mobilization, the potential strength of non-elite mobilization becomes a key 
check on both elite asset grabs and elites’ tendencies to hyper-develop the coercive side 
of the state apparatus. 
For most of the global south all of this takes place under circumstances in which success 
requires escaping institutional nightmares imposed by history, with AJR’s colonially-
imposed ‘extractive institutions’ being the primary case in point. It is, however, a 
central premise of the extended institutional turn that such escape is indeed possible. 
Denying the possibility of political choice would negate the very historical narratives on 
which the extension of the institutional turn is predicated. 
At the same time, the extension of the institutional turn requires accepting the idea that 
exogenous challenges may turn what seem to be institutional dreams into nightmares. 
Botswana offers a heartrending example of how institutions that appeared for decades to 
epitomize effectiveness can suddenly be revealed as incapable of dealing with the 
challenge at hand, creating a critical juncture forged from failure rather than 
opportunity. 
And this brings us back to Swidler’s fundamental proposition. An institutional analysis 
that takes goals and interests for granted would be intellectually impoverished. The 
better part human needs and desires are culturally constructed. Enabling people to 
construct and reconstruct their aims is as basic a task of institutions as enabling people 
to satisfy the needs and desires that have been constructed. Just because this complicates 
linear explanatory logics does not give us an excuse for ignoring it. 
The extension of the institutional turn has a long way to go before it succeeds in 
providing consistently compelling explanations of developmental outcomes to replace 
the deceptively parsimonious proofs offered by the old double finesse version of   13
institutional analysis. Nonetheless, it has come a long way from its Northian origins. It 
continues to generate exciting debates across disciplines as well as within them. It is an 
agenda of both heuristic and practical value, well worth pursuing. 
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